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THE TURNING POINT APPROACHES:
THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITION
Relying on the political offense exception to extradition, courts in
recent years have found fugitive Provisional Irish Republican
Army members discovered in the United States not extraditable to
the United Kingdom. The recent Senate ratification of a supple-
mentary extradition treaty with the United Kingdom, however, vir-
tually eliminates the political offense exception between the two
countries. This Comment argues that the Treaty runs counter to
the long-standing history and purpose of extradition and the polit-
ical offense exception and synthesizes the recent extradition deci-
sions into a proposal for necessary legislative reform.
INTRODUCTION
With world terrorism increasingly the subject of public concern,
the United States government has been considering new measures to
promote its reduction. Because of the fear that the United States
may become a haven for terrorists,' traditional extradition policy
and procedure have come under increased scrutiny. Decisions of
United States courts not to extradite certain Provisional Irish Re-
publican Army (PIRA) members to the United Kingdom2 to face
charges for alleged "terrorist" acts, have led to demands for changes
in the extradition process.3 In recent extradition cases, the courts
have differed as to what factors are appropriate in making a political
offense determination.4 The executive branch, meanwhile, has taken
1. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981).
2. In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), re-
printed in 132 CONG. REC. S9146 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) [hereinafter cited to the
Congressional Record]; In re Mackin, 80 Cr. Misc. I (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1981), appeal
dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 RPA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), vacated, 783
F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986).
3. Extradition is the "process by which one nation surrenders for purpose of trial
and punishment, individuals accused of crimes committed outside its borders, to the na-
tion in which the alleged crimes were committed." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289
(1902).
4. Compare Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (arguing for the
continued application of the traditional political offense test) with Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
steps to rid altogether the extradition determination of the political
offense exception. The 1985 Supplementary Extradition Treaty be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom,' is an example of
attempts by the executive branch to change the political offense de-
termination process.
This Comment argues that the Supplementary Treaty is inappro-
priate in light of the fundamental concerns underlying United States
extradition procedure. The Comment will also synthesize the various
factors the courts have considered in making a political offense de-
termination, and propose a viable test for the political offense excep-
tion. Through legislative enactment of such a test, Congress can re-
affirm the principles that have governed United States extradition
procedure for the past 150 years, and yet provide the means for ex-
tradition of terrorists.
General Background
Extradition has a history dating back as far as 1280 B.C., when
Ramses II, Pharaoh of Egypt, included such a provision in a peace
treaty with the Hittites.6 From these beginnings until the late eight-
eenth century, extradition agreements were entered to ensure the re-
turn of fugitives sought for political reasons, with little concern ex-
pressed for the return of common criminals.7
In the 1800's, the nature of extradition agreements underwent a
reversal of sorts. Extradition agreements suddenly were concerned
with returning persons sought for committing various common
crimes, while providing for either an understood or explicit exception
to extradition requests for persons sought for committing offenses of
a political nature.8 The revolutions in France and the United States
and the political theories underlying them were the impetus for this
significant change.9
Various ideals took hold in Western Europe and the United States
that demanded this reversal in extradition policy. These governments
began to acknowledge the right of individuals "to resort to political
activism to foster political change." 10 As a result of these ideological
concerns, these countries adopted the policy of not returning such
individuals to countries where they would be subjected to unfair tri-
5. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United
Kingdom, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104 (1985).
6. 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE &b. I, § 1.3 (1983) [hereinafter UNITED STATES EXTRADITION].
7. Id. ch. 1, § 1.4.
8. Id.
9. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
370-74 [hereinafter WORLD PUBLIC ORDER].
10. Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition,
13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 622 (1981).
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als and punishment because of their political beliefs." The return of
individuals under such circumstances would essentially amount to
aiding foreign governments in suppressing political dissent.
History in the United States
The United States entered into its first extradition agreement
early in its history. An extradition provision was included within the
Jay Treaty negotiated with Great Britain soon after the United
States gained independence. This extradition agreement, however,
was short-lived.
In 1799 Great Britain made a request under the Jay Treaty for
the return of Jonathan Robbins, an alleged murderer and mutineer
from a British warship. Robbins claimed that he was an American
and had been impressed into service by the British. When this re-
quest came before a local magistrate,1 2 President John Adams wrote
a letter to the judge imploring him to grant the request for extradi-
tion. When the American public later discovered that the judge had
been pressured into granting the request, such public outcry ensued
that another extradition request was not processed until 1842.13
United States extradition law, as it has developed from 1840 until
recently, encompasses two very important concerns: 1) the desire to
avoid unwarranted executive influence on the extradition determina-
tion, and 2) the ideological motivation not to help another country
suppress internal political dissent. The former concern was mani-
fested in the passage of the 1848 Extradition Act. 14 This statute re-
quired that extradition requests be made under provisions of a treaty
and subject to judicial proceedings in federal district court. The un-
derlying theory behind this enactment was that the "judiciary should
have the authority to review action such that fundamental individual
liberty would not be improperly infringed."1 5 Though the Extradition
Act has had some minor amendments since 1848, this underlying
theory has remained the controlling concern in the extradition
procedure.10
11. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 9, at 425; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793.
12. See United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty:
Hearings on Treaty Doc. 99-8 before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1985) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Professor Chris-
topher H. Pyle, Mount Holyoke College, Department of Politics).
13. Id.
14. Extradition Act of 1848, Ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302 (1848).
15. See I UNITED STATES EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at ch. II, § 2.11.
16. Id.
The concern over individual liberty was the impetus behind the
political offense exception to extradition in United States treaties. In
its early history, the United States was inherently suspicious of the
government and judicial systems within other countries. Thomas Jef-
ferson, in response to a request by France in 1793 for the return of
four fugitives alleged to have conspired against the Republic, stated:
"[t]he evil of protecting malefactors of every dye is sensibly felt here
as in other nations, but until a reformation of the criminal code of
most nations, to deliver fugitives from them would be to become
"917their accomplice ....
When the United States eventually entered into another extradi-
tion agreement in 1842,18 an exception from extradition for political
offenses was believed to be an unwritten provision of the agree-
ment.19 In the numerous extradition treaties that the United States
has entered into since, a provision providing for the exception from
extradition of political offenses as determined by the requested coun-
try generally has been included.20 Thus, the political offense doctrine
has a history dating back as far as modern United States extradition
law itself.
Present United States Extradition Procedure
Before an individual may be extradited from the United States,
United States law requires that an extradition treaty presently be in
force with the requesting country. 21 To initiate an extradition re-
quest, the requesting country must present a request to the Depart-
17. T. JEFFERSON. WRITINGS, VI, 462 (Ford ed. 1894), quoted in Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 12, at 113.
18. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8
Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
19. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 113.
20. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 9, at 371.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982). This statute provides:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States,
or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any
judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon com-
plaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with
having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any
of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for
the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such
justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be
heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to
sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he
shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before
him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of
the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such
person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall
issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper
jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made.
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ment of State.2 2 In the past, requesting states also were required to
file a claim with the appropriate federal district court.23 Recently,
however, the State Department generally has made an initial deter-
mination as to the sufficiency of the request before presenting the
claim to the appropriate United States Attorney for prosecution. 24
In order to gain extradition, the request must be approved at both
the judicial and executive level. At the judicial level, a hearing is
held to determine whether: 1) the person before the court is the per-
son sought; 2) the offense charged is an extraditable offense as pro-
vided for in the treaty; 3) the offense charged is a crime within the
state where the hearing is being held; and 4) there is probable cause
to believe that the person before the court committed the offense
charged.2 5 The purpose of the hearing is to determine only whether
there is probable cause to believe the person committed the offense
charged, not to determine the actual guilt or innocence of the indi-
vidual. Because of the narrow function of the extradition hearing, an
extradition determination is not subject to appeal by either the indi-
vidual sought or the requesting government.26 The individual sought,
however, may apply for a writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge
the extradition order.27 Furthermore, the requesting government is
free to make another identical extradition request if it is denied in
the previous attempt; a decision not to extradite has no res judicata
effect.28
The input of the executive branch is limited to those occasions
when there has been a judicial determination in favor of extradition.
A judicial determination that an individual is not extraditable under
the present request is final, at least with respect to that request. But
a determination by the courts that the individual sought is extradita-
ble can be ignored if the Secretary of State, in his discretion, deter-
mines the request should be denied. 29 The individual sought will fi-
22. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 9, at 511.
23. Id.
24. This has been the method in all the recent extradition cases. For a discussion
of extradition procedure, see generally II UNITED STATES EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at
ch. IX, § 2.
25. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 9, at 515.
26. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1920); Eain, 641 F.2d at 508;
Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125-27; Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 932 (1978).
27. Eain, 641 F.2d at 1368; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 128; Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1364.
28. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 128; Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1368.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3168. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986);
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); In re Lin-
coln, 228 F.2d (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 241 U.S. 651 (1915).
nally be returned to the requesting government when both the
judicial and executive branch recognize the request as proper under
the treaty.
THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION - INTERPRETATION BY THE
COURTS
The determination of whether the political offense exception ap-
plies to a particular extradition request has been taken up by the
judiciary.30 The political offense determination is viewed as part of
the magistrate's determination of whether the offense charged is an
extraditable offense under the applicable treaty.31
Traditionally, under the political offense doctrine, two types of po-
litical crimes have been distinguished: "pure" and "relative" of-
fenses. 2 "Pure" political offenses are "acts aimed directly at the
government and have none of the elements of ordinary crime." 33
Crimes included under this category - such as treason, sedition,
and espionage - are specifically excluded from the list of extradita-
ble crimes in any treaty.
"Relative" political offenses, however, have proven more difficult
to deal with. These offenses involve the "commission of a common
crime in connection with a political act or event." 34 Such offenses are
normally crimes for which extradition would be granted but for the
political nature of the crime. Numerous approaches have been devel-
oped for determining whether any particular offense is deserving of
exception from extradition under the political offense doctrine.3 5 In
the United States, the courts have adopted the "incidence" test.
The Incidence Test - Traditional View
The test applied by the United States courts for the political of-
fense exception originally was taken from the British view as out-
lined in In re Castioni.6 In that case, Switzerland requested Great
Britain to return a Swiss participant in the storming of the govern-
ment palace in which an official was killed. The British court refused
extradition, finding that Castioni's actions were "incidental to and
formed a part of the political disturbances. 37 The court stated fur-
30. See supra note 21; see also Eain, 641 F.2d at 513; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 134.
31. Eain, 641 F.2d at 513.
32. See Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders". The Political Of-
fense Exception to Extradition in U.S. Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 169, 178 (1984).
33. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793 (citations omitted).
34. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 32, at 178.
35. Three basic approaches to the political offense issue have developed: 1) the
French "objective" test; 2) the Swiss "proportionality" or "means-end" test; and 3) the
Anglo-American "incidence" test. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 794-96.
36. [1891] Q.B. 149 (1890).
37. Id. at 166 (Hawkins, J.).
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ther that common crimes committed "in the course" and "in the fur-
therance" of political uprisings would be considered political
offenses.38
The Castioni decision has been interpreted by United States
courts as establishing a two-fold political offense test: 1) the occur-
rence of an uprising or other violent political disturbance at the time
of the charged offense, and 2) a charged offense that is incidental to
in the course of, or in the furtherance of the uprising. 39 Should the
magistrate find these two requirements met, the fugitive's offense
will be considered political and the extradition request will be
denied.
Exactly what information is to be considered under this test, how-
ever, is relatively unclear. The United States Supreme Court had its
only occasion to deal with the political offense exception in 1896, in
Ornelas v. Ruiz.4° That case involved several Mexican nationals re-
siding in the United States who had crossed the border from Texas
to loot a nearby Mexican village. In looting the village, they at-
tacked a small group of Mexican soldiers. Mexico requested that
these individuals be returned for prosecution. The Supreme Court
upheld the magistrate's finding that the individuals were extradita-
ble. In dicta, the Court remarked that the crimes committed did not
constitute political offenses because there was not sufficient evidence
to support the claim of a political uprising.41 The decision indicated
several factors that might be relevant to the political offense deter-
mination, such as "the character of the foray, the mode of attack,
the persons killed or captured, and the kind of property taken or
destroyed. ' 42 The guiding factors listed in Ornelas, however, have
been all but ignored in later extradition requests, 3 at least until
recently.
One rule guiding the extradition process generally has been
adopted by United States courts. The courts have imposed a rule of
noninquiry on their extradition decisions. The rule of noninquiry
presumes that any country with which the United States has an ex-
38. Id. at 156 (Denman, J.).
39. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 796 (citations omitted); see also Garcia-Guillern v.
United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1971); In re Ezeta,
62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
40. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 511.
43. See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 32, at 184-85.
tradition treaty will treat those extradited fairly.44 With this rule,
the court precludes the introduction of any evidence intended to
prove that the individual sought for extradition may receive an un-
fair trial in the requesting country or be subject to persecution be-
cause of his political beliefs. 45 The rule reflects a policy decision by
the judiciary that such an examination into foreign political systems
is inappropriate for the judicial branch. Rather, such an examination
is best left to the executive branch in its discretionary confirmation
of judicial decisions in favor of extradition."
Cases involving extradition requests are relatively rare occurrences
for any individual court, and those involving the political offense is-
sue are rarer still.47 Ignoring the factors outlined in Ornelas, the
courts have mechanically applied the incidence test. The test has
changed little from that outlined in Castioni and first applied here in
In re Ezeta.4" As such, the United States judiciary's application of
the incidence test has been criticized because the courts often find
the test met whenever an offense with political overtones had even
the slightest connection to a domestic uprising.49
But recent history has seen a dramatic change in the forms and
nature of activities undertaken for various "political" causes. Com-
mentators feared that the political offense exception, as applied by
the courts, would be a substantial barrier to attempts at bringing
terrorists found within the United States to justice. 50 The "political
offense" test appeared to blur the distinction between political rebel-
lion, to be protected, and terrorism, to be punished.
Recent court decisions in extradition determinations highlight this
concern.5 1 Most of these cases involve offenses of a very violent and
reprehensible nature, seemingly committed to further some political
objective. With that in mind, the judiciary has attempted to form an
acceptable distinction between violent revolutionary conduct that
will be protected under the political offense exception and terrorism.
It appears that the judiciary has been successful in creating valid
guidelines for making such a distinction; these guidelines attempt to
44. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1910).
45. See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 32, at 188-92.
46. Eain, 641 F.2d at 518; see also Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626 (7th
Cir. 1932); Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
47. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 301 (statement of M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, Professor of Law, DePaul University). In the last 30 years, the political offense
issue has been raised no more than two dozen times.
48. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
49. See I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 (1971); Eain,
641 F.2d at 520.
50. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 260-64 (statement of Department of
State representative Judge Sofaer); Eain, 641 F.2d at 520.
51. See cases cited supra note 2; Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
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preserve the political freedom of all individuals, while at the same
time attempting to send true "terrorists" to justice.
RECENT COURT DECISIONS
The controversy arising from recent court extradition decisions
stems from four United Kingdom requests and one Israeli request
for the extradition of certain fugitives. The United Kingdom sought
four PIRA members for offenses committed in Northern Ireland and
England;52 Israel sought a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
member for offenses committed in Israel.5 3 All the fugitives sought
in these requests attempted to avoid extradition by claiming that
their offenses fell under the political offense exception. Most of the
courts involved in these decisions first were confronted by arguments
from the government that the political offense determination is for
the executive branch to make. Various arguments were put forth by
the government in an effort to persuade the courts to refrain from
deciding this question, but in every instance the court responded by
reaffirming the judicial role in deciding the political offense issue.
54
52. McMullen, a Northern Ireland native, is a former soldier in the British Army
who deserted his attachment prior to its involvement in the Bloody Sunday shootings in
Londonderry, Northern Ireland, in 1972. In 1974 as a member of the PIRA, he was
involved in the bombing of a British Army barracks in England.
Mackin, also a citizen of Northern Ireland, shot a British soldier in Andersontown,
Northern Ireland, in 1978. He and another PIRA member were searching for a lost taxi
cab when they found themselves surrounded by undercover agents of the British Army.
The soldier, Mackin, and his PIRA accomplice were all shot when the latter two at-
tempted to avoid capture. Doherty and other PIRA members took over a house in Belfast
in May 1980, in an attempt to ambush a British Army convoy. Before this ambush could
occur, however, they were discovered by a British patrol. In the ensuing exchange of
gunfire, a British Army officer was killed. Doherty was arrested at the scene, but he and
several others escaped prison before final sentencing was handed down by the Northern
Ireland courts.
Quinn is a United States citizen who lived in Ireland for several years. Quinn claimed
to have become a member of the Active Service Unit, an offshoot of the PIRA, during
this time. In 1974 and 1975, Quinn was a member of the "Balcombe Street Four." This
group was linked to letter bombs that were sent to an army chaplin, a British judge, and
a newspaper chairman in the London area, along with three bombs that were placed in
various public areas. Quinn murdered a London policeman in February 1975, when the
officer stopped him for questioning. Quinn, along with the other three, eventually made it
to the United States in their attempts to escape prosecution. See cases cited supra note 2.
53. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
Eain involved the Israeli request for PLO member Ziad Abu Eain. Eain was being
sought in connection with a bombing of a crowded market area in Tiberius which killed
two young Israeli boys. Eain escaped capture by crossing into Jordan and eventually
making his way to the United States.
54. Eain, 641 F.2d at 513-18; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125-30; Quinn, 783 F.2d at
786-90. The government's arguments opposing any judicial interference included ones
The analysis of the political offense question in each case began
with the recognition that United States precedent required that some
form of the incidence test be met for an offense to be excepted from
extradition. 55 Either directly or indirectly, the courts rejected the
view that the incidence test is satisfied by a mere finding of a politi-
cal "uprising" and that the offenses committed were contemporane-
ous with that uprising. 6 But the courts differed in their understand-
ing of what further requirements were to be met under the political
offense exception. In each case, the courts were trying to determine
whether the actions purportedly committed by the individuals sought
constituted political dissidence or terrorist action.
Under the "uprising" prong of the test, the courts have agreed
that some minimum level of political opposition must be shown to
exist when the particular offenses took place for the exception to be
applicable. 57 In all the PIRA cases, there was a determination that a
political uprising was occurring in Northern Ireland at the time of
the offenses. 58
In Eain v. Wilkes,59 involving an Israeli extradition request, the
Seventh Circuit tried to make a distinction between internal conflicts
involving "on-going, organized battles between contending armies" 0
and those involving forces of "the dispersed nature of the PLO.""1
The Seventh Circuit noted that, as the uprising moved from the for-
mer type to the latter, it becomes much more difficult to determine
and prove which acts deserve inclusion within the political offense
exception and which are merely individual acts of violence. 2
Two other courts, however, explicitly have rejected this reasoning.
The Southern District of New York has acknowledged that the polit-
ical offense doctrine is not limited to offenses occurring in more
traditional, military-like struggles. Rather, past history has shown
that successful rebellions can be carried out by "guerilla" forces. 3
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not for the courts to
decide which forms of conduct are "acceptable" methods for
based on treaty interpretation, the political question doctrine of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), and the constitutional separation of powers in the area of foreign policy.
55. Eain, 641 F.2d at 518; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 806-10;
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 274; McMullen, 132 CONG. REc. at S9147.
56. Eain, 641 F.2d at 519; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 806-10; Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at
274; McMullen, 132 CONG. REc. at S9146.
57. Eain, 641 F.2d at 519-20; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 807.
58. Mackin 668 F.2d at 125; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 813; Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at
273-74; McMullen, 132 CONG. REc. at S9147.
59. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981);
see also supra note 53.
60. Eain, 641 F.2d at 519.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 520.
63. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275.
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revolution.84
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Quinn v. Robinson65 highlighted
two particular factors under the "uprising" component which help to
ensure that international terrorism will not be protected under the
political offense exception.66 First, no offenses occurring beyond the
borders of the country or territory whose government the dissidents
desire to change can ever be included under the exception. Second,
although the court refused to rely solely on this factor in Quinn, the
court held that the offender and his dissident group usually must be
nationals of the territory in revolt for their conduct to be considered
as part of an uprising by persons attempting to change their own
government.67
In respect to the "incident to" component of the incidence test,
Quinn stands alone among these decisions in attempting to adhere to
the traditional understanding of this component as laid down in Cas-
tioni. Quinn held that only a "liberal nexus" between the acts in-
volved in the particular extradition request and the internal uprising
needs to be shown in order for the political offense exception to be
met.6 8 Acts meeting this requirement are limited to those which take
place within the geographic boundaries of the uprising, are contem-
poraneous with the uprising, and are "casually or ideologically re-
lated to the uprising. 6 9
The other three PIRA cases and the PLO case establish further
guidelines in determining the extent of the political offense excep-
tion. These courts held that an investigation into the dissident organ-
ization involved in the uprising was necessary in making their extra-
dition decisions.7 0 The individual must establish membership in a
dissident group,71 and in some instances, substantiate his claim by
showing that his actions were conducted under the direction or ap-
proval of the organization. 2 This reflects a demand for proof that
the individual's conduct was governed by the organization rather
64. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 804-05.
65. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
66. Id. at 807.
67. Id. at 807-08.
68. Id. at 809.
69. Id.
70. Eain, 641 F.2d at 519-21; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125; Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at
276; McMullen, 132 CONG. REc. at S9146.
71. Eain, 641 F.2d at 520; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125; Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 275;
McMullen, 132 CONG. REC. at S9146.
72. Eain, 641 F.2d at 520-22; Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 275-76; McMullen, 132
CONG. REc. at S9147.
than a merely personal motivation to do harm.
Additionally, two courts have held that the political offense deter-
mination requires an inquiry into the nature of the offense and its
consequences. In Eain, the court held that acts such as the "indis-
criminate bombing of a civilian population" so closely resemble an-
archist activity that those accused of such acts must establish a di-
rect link between themselves, the political organization's goals, and
the offense in question to obtain political offense protection. 3 The
district court in In Re Doherty went further in stating that indis-
criminate acts of killing or wounding people and destroying property
cannot be political offenses.7 4 These approaches apparently place sig-
nificance on whether the victims of the offense are linked to the mili-
tary or government, or are merely innocent civilians.75 At least one
commentator has read these decisions as creating a "wanton crimes"
exception to the political offense decision.7" At any rate, this ap-
proach seems designed to ensure that terrorism is never found wor-
thy of exception from extradition.
Other courts, however, have refused to look into the method and
result of the acts before making the political offense decision. As the
district court in In re McMullen held, when the requirements of the
political offense test are met, the individual will be excluded from
extradition "even though the offense be deplorable and heinous."77
The Ninth Circuit viewed such inquiry as inappropriate for the
courts, involving nothing more than an attempt "to impose our no-
tions of civilized strife on people who are seeking to overthrow the
regimes in control of their countries in contexts and circumstances
that we have not experienced, and with which we can identify only
with the greatest difficulty. '78
Finally, international law may require that certain offenses always
be subject to prosecution. The district court in Doherty specifically
points to instances where acts have been considered worthy of pun-
ishment even though committed during time of war.79 The court goes
on to hold that no act which violates international law and "interna-
tional standards of civilized conduct" 80 is ever to be understood as
meeting the political offense requirements. The Ninth Circuit added
that "crimes against humanity" 81 are never to be protected under
73. Eain, 641 F.2d at 521.
74. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275.
75. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 802.
76. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 128-29 (statement of Professor Chris-
topher H. Pyle).
77. McMullen, 132 CONG. REc. at S9147.
78. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 804.
79. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 274.
80. Id.
81. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 800-01.
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the exception.
Although all the cases agree that a distinction within the political
offense exception needs to be made so that "terrorist" acts are not
protected, disagreement exists on what additional considerations
need to be made, if any, under the traditional incidence test. While
the Eain court went so far as to hold that many offenses, when they
involve violence and civilian victims, are not deserving of inclusion
under the exception, the court in Quinn refused to peremptorily ex-
clude such acts. And while all the cases continue to uphold the role
of the judiciary in making the political offense determination, they
differ on how far the idea of ideological neutrality is to be taken
within this determination.
ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE COURTS
The above cases were not decided in a judicial vacuum. A height-
ened awareness of the terrorism problem prevails in both the execu-
tive and legislative branches. After nearly a century of acquiescence
to the judicial power to make the political offense determination,
2
the executive branch now contends that it maintains the power to
make such determinations.
The 97th Congress considered many possible changes in the extra-
dition process under the proposed Extradition Act of 1981.83 Under
initial consideration was a provision placing the political offense issue
solely in the hands of the executive branch. The Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee rejected such a change, favoring the continuance
of the judicial role in the political offense decision.
4 Both the House
and Senate versions of the bill attempted to introduce various
changes in the political offense test to adapt it to modern concerns
against terrorism.8 5 No version was ever passed by Congress.
The Reagan Administration became increasingly concerned as
British requests for the extradition of PIRA members repeatedly
were denied. Such decisions were seen as inconsistent with the gov-
ernment's call for greater international cooperation in dealing with
terrorism. Moreover, the decisions directly threatened to undermine
Great Britain's support of United States efforts to combat terrorism.
The Department of State found another short-run tactic available
82. See Mackin, 668 F.2d at 136-37.
83. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-83,
17 AKRON L. REV. 495 (1984); Banoff & Pyle, supra note 32, at 192-99.
84. S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982).
85. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 83.
for dealing with the political offense exception. At least with regards
to the United States extradition treaty with Great Britain, a quick
solution to the problem could be brought about simply by amending
the treaty so as to minimize the reach of the political offense excep-
tion, thereby negating the controversial decisions handed down by
the judiciary. This approach quickly and successfully culminated
with the signing of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty (Supple-
mentary Treaty) between the United States and the United King-
dom on June 25, 1985.86
The Supplementary Treaty alters and adds to the extradition
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.8 7 Secre-
tary of State George Schultz described the Supplementary Treaty as"a significant step to improve law enforcement cooperation and
counter the threat of international terrorism and other crimes of
violence."88
The United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty
The provisions of primary concern within the Supplementary
Treaty, as submitted for Senate approval, were articles 1 and 4. Ar-
ticle 1 essentially eliminates the political offense exception from con-
sideration in any British extradition request.8 " It attempts to attack
86. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United
Kingdom, reprinted in 24 1.L.M. 1104 (1985).
87. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.ST.
227; T.I.A.S. No. 8468 (entered into force Jan. 21, 1977).
88. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United
Kingdom, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104 (1985) (letter from Secretary of State George
Schultz accompanying the treaty).
89. Id. at 1105-07. Article 1 provides:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following offenses shall
be regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature at The Hague on 16 December
1970;
(b) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Mon-
treal on 23 September 1971;
c) an offense within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplo-
matic Agents, opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973;
d) an offense within the scope of the International Convention against the Tak-
ing of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on December 1979;
e) murder;
f) manslaughter;
g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or unlawful detention, including
the taking of a hostage;
i) the following offenses related to explosives:
(1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious dam-
age to property; or
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terrorism by reasoning that certain types of acts are always terrorist
in nature when committed in the United Kingdom or the United
States. Article 4 makes the treaty provisions retroactive with respect
to offenses committed before the Treaty takes effect.90
During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the
Supplementary Treaty, a representative for the Department of State
acknowledged that the United States government was already in the
process of negotiating similar agreements with other nations.
91 The
State Department's rationale for entering into such agreements is
that, "with respect to violent crimes, the political offense exception
has no place in extradition treaties between stable democracies, in
which the political system is available to redress legitimate griev-
ances and the judicial process provides fair treatment.
' 92 Appar-
ently, whenever a state is determined by the executive branch to be a
"stable democracy" with a "fair" judicial process, the government
plans to eliminate violent offenses from the political offense excep-
(2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person who in-
tends either himself or through another person to endanger life or cause serious
damage to property;
(j) the following offenses relating to firearms or ammunition:
(1) the possesion of a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends either
himself or through another person to endanger life; or
(2) the use of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest
or detention of himself or another person;
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard
as to whether the life of another would thereby be endangered;
(I) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
90. Id. at 1107-08. Article 4 provides:
This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offense committed before or af-
ter this Supplementary Treaty enters into force, provided that this Supplemen-
tary Treaty shall not apply to an offense committed before this Supplementary
Treaty enters into force which was not an offense under the laws of both Con-
tracting Parties at the time of its commission.
This retroactive clause has been criticized because of its practical effect. It changes the
rule of a judicial procedure with respect to the political offense exception to extradition,
concerning and after the acts committed, in order to almost assure the likelihood of the
British requests being approved. The purpose of this clause seems clear - to make those
PIRA members previously found not extraditable because of the political offense excep-
tions subject to almost certain extradition if the request is renewed. Such a provision
seems to violate both the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder. See 132 CONG. REc. S9153-60 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (debate on Senate
floor over the retroactive clause and the failure of an attempt to amend it so individuals
unsuccessfully sought before could not be sought again); Senate Hearings, supra note 12,
at 528-30 (statement of Francis Boyle, Professor of Law, University of Illinois).
91. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 265 (statement of Department of
State representative Judge Sofaer).
92. Id.
tion to extradition.
The Supplementary Treaty was ratified by more than two-thirds
of the Senate on July 17, 1986,'3 but not without some changes. The
Foreign Relations Committee proposed certain amendments to the
Treaty which were accepted by both governments. One change alters
article 1, diminishing the list of crimes the original Supplementary
Treaty eliminated from the political offense exception. 4 The Senate
also made changes in article 3(a), which adopts article 5 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,9" as was modi-
fied within the proposed Extradition Act of 1984.96 That provision
provides the magistrate before whom the extradition request is
brought with the power to deny extradition if it is established: 1) "by
a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition has
in fact been made with a view to try to punish him on account of his
race, religion, nationality, or political opinion,' ' 97 or 2) that if he
were handed over, he would "be prejudiced at his trial or punished,
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions."98
Even with these changes, the Senate has ratified a treaty that vir-
tually eliminates the political offense exception from the United
States extradition agreement with the United Kingdom. The Treaty,
through article 3, also forces the judicial branch to ignore its long-
standing rule of noninquiry into the motives and processes of the re-
questing government, at least when that government is Great Brit-
ain. Thus, although it seems that the Foreign Relations Committee
has gone to great efforts to ensure that some safeguards for individ-
ual rights remain, article 3 forces the courts to make foreign policy
determinations that they traditionally have felt they should avoid.
The Problems with a Treaty-by-Treaty Modification of the
Political Offense Exception
There are several reasons why the decision to change the political
offense exception on a treaty-by-treaty basis is both unwise and in-
consistent with the purposes served by the exception. On an histori-
cal level, the executive branch seems to view the whole of extradition
doctrine, if not at least the political offense exception, as a matter of
93. 132 CONG. REC. S9251-73 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).
94. S. ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1986). References in the origi-
nal Supplementary Treaty to property damage, possession, intent, and conspiracy wereeliminated; manslaughter was qualified by "voluntary", and unlawful detention was qual-
ified by "serious." Compare this with original version, supra note 89.
95. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1977, 15 I.L.M. 1272.
96. H.R. REP. No. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 194 (1984).
97. S. ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1986).
98. Id.
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foreign policy.9 9 Consequently, there is the belief that an extradition
decision must conform to current foreign policy "concerns" of the
state. Clearly, the initial decision whether to enter an extradition
treaty with any given nation is a foreign affairs decision, best left to
the executive branch;100 however, the determination of how the ex-
tradition process is to be effectuated and what principles are to gov-
ern it, has roots much deeper than the foreign policy goals of any
single administration.
As stated earlier,101 a concern with protecting "fundamental indi-
vidual liberty" as opposed to executive determinations based on for-
eign policy concerns, underlies existing extradition treaties. This was
the major reason for granting the initial extradition decision to an
impartial representative of the judicial branch 02 - the branch tra-
ditionally empowered with decisions concerning fundamental
fairness.
The political offense exception serves a similar significant purpose.
The United States is a nation born of a revolutionary uprising. The
founding fathers recognized a continual right of the people to mani-
fest their dissent in any government they find unsatisfactory, al-
lowing drastic acts if necessary - a right specifically set forth in the
Declaration of Independence.103 When the United States, after more
than fifty years of reluctance, finally began to enter extradition
agreements as a matter of policy, the desire of the government not to
be a party to another's attempt to punish dissent was clear.
104 This
desired neutrality is the guiding force behind the long history of the
United States as an asylum from political persecution and is the
foundation underlying the political offense exception.
As a practical matter, changing the political offense decision on a
treaty-by-treaty basis involves unwise "favored nation" determina-
99. For a discussion of government arguments in favor of executive authority over
political offense exception in Eain, Mackin, and Quinn, see supra note 54.
100. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the Constitution gives this power to the execu-
tive branch).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
102. Id.
103. Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776). The Declaration provides
that
[w]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of [the people's ina-
lienable rights], it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to insti-
tute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety
and Happiness.
104. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 112-15 (statement of Professor Chris-
topher H. Pyle).
tions.105 When the executive branch decides to enter an agreement
with one nation under the rationale expressed in the United States-
United Kingdom Treaty,10 6 it is impliedly telling nations not chosen
for such a treaty that their government is not sufficiently "demo-
cratic," or their judicial process is not sufficiently "fair." This may
lead to the alienation of that government, or worse, to pressures upon
our government to enter such agreements with states who truly do
not meet the criteria. A perfect example is the Supplementary Ex-
tradition Treaty with the "democratic" regime of President Ferdi-
nand Marcos in the Philippines proposed in 1981.107 That treaty
would have removed the political offense determination from the ju-
diciary and placed it instead with the Secretary of State. The State
Department eventually decided not to submit the treaty to the Sen-
ate for formal consideration when it became apparent that the treaty
was overwhelmingly opposed. 0o
The Supplementary Extradition Treaty with Great Britain suffers
additional problems. The courts are trying to create an acceptable
distinction between offenses not worthy of inclusion under the politi-
cal offense exception and those offenses for which the exception was
designed to protect. This distinction is made difficult because there
are no universally accepted definitions of what constitutes "terror-
ism" and what is a "political offense." Although the court's line-
drawing may seem unclear to many, it is more consistent with the
political offense exception's purpose than the Treaty's method of
completely eliminating many offenses from political offense
consideration.
The Treaty is overbroad in its attempt to avoid protecting ter-
rorists. 109 To exempt almost all possible forms of violent activity
from consideration is too simplistic a method to ensure that terrorist
activities never come within the political offense exception. In fact,
most of the activities of the revolutionaries who led the United
States to its own independence would have been extraditable offenses
under the Treaty. 110 The desire to eliminate difficult distinctions
105. Id. at 105, and 413-16 (statement of Morton Halperin, representative of theAmerican Civil Liberties Union). But see id. at 395-400 (statement of Steven Lubet,Professor of Law, Northwestern University) (Professor Lubet argues that although uni-formity of extradition procedure is desirable, it is not necessary to have uniformity in thetypes of offenses considered to be political, in light of the vast array of governments with
which the United States has extradition treaties).
106. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
107. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 119-20 (statement of Professor Chris-topher H. Pyle) (presents the proposed Philippines treaty as a case-study for the problem
with the treaty-by-treaty approach).
108. Id. at 120.
109. See supra notes 89 & 94 (crimes no longer "political" under the Supplemen-
tary Treaty).
110. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 779-80 (Appendix A(l) to statement
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from the political offense issue initially may seem worthwhile, but
the method used by the Treaty eliminates the difficulties at the ex-
pense of the broader ideals that underlie the exception.'
11
In support of the Treaty, some commentators have argued that the
political offense exception has become an absolute defense to extradi-
tion for PIRA members.11 2 The exception is viewed as violating one
of its original purposes, that of allowing the United States govern-
ment to remain neutral towards other countries' internal conflicts.
Refusing extradition in every case involving PIRA members is char-
acterized as de facto support for their cause." 3 But this argument
ignores the underlying policy of the political offense determination.
The recognition of the political offense exception in any particular
extradition decision is not a decision that the individual's cause is
worthy of support. A decision not to extradite under the exception is
a neutral factual determination. Such a decision recognizes that an
uprising political in nature is occurring in the requesting country and
any fugitive sought for actions in furtherance of that uprising will
not be returned unless exceptional circumstances are shown. The de-
cision not to extradite is not so much a show of support for an indi-
vidual's cause as it is a reflection of United States policy not to aid
another country to suppress its internal political dissent.
ADAPTING THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO MODERN
CONCERNS
Within the last decade, many proposals have been offered to adapt
the political offense exception to modern realities.1
4 Proposals such
as transferring the political offense determination to the executive
branch,"15 or specifically eliminating most crimes from being consid-
ered political" 6 are appealingly simple solutions; however, these pro-
of Professor Keara O'Dempsey) (Lists past United States Senators who would have been
potentially extraditable under the Supplementary Treaty).
11l. See supra text accompanying notes 8-20.
112. E.g., Note, Eliminating the Political Offense Exception for Violent Crimes:
The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 26
VA. J. INT'L L. 768 (1986).
113. Id. at 775.
114. See, e.g., Banoff & Pyle, supra note 32 (proposing legislative reform of the
political offense doctrine as applied by the courts); Note, Terrorist Extradition and the
Political Offense Exception An Administrative Solution, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 163 (1980)
(proposing a procedure giving the initial determination of the exception to the Secretary
of State).
115. See, e.g., Note, supra note 114.
116. As the Supplementary Treaty essentially succeeds at doing. See supra notes
89 & 94.
posals fail to adequately deal with the issue. The issue in an extradi-
tion case is not so much a particular foreign policy concern as it is
the continued liberty of an individual. American tradition demands
that such liberty not be deprived without a fundamentally fair and
neutral hearing.
Congress long ago left the extradition determination primarily to
the judicial branch.117 For much of United States history, the politi-
cal offense exception has been viewed as an integral part of the
court's extradition determination. The political offense exception has
evolved into a crucial aspect of the judiciary's role in interpreting
extradition treaty provisions. The courts have attempted to develop a
political offense test that respects the concerns for individual liberty
and ideological neutrality, while avoiding the sanctioning of
terrorism.118
The apparent inconsistencies seen among the courts in their appli-
cation of the test stem not from a lack of recognition of this histori-
cal backdrop, but from uncertainty as to how to best effectuate these
concerns in light of the world-wide escalation of terrorist activity.
Recently, the courts have found it extremely difficult to distinguish
between domestic revolutionary conduct and unacceptable terrorist
activity.1 9 Although the methods of analysis in these cases appears
incompatible, various points of emphasis should be used to guide po-
litical offense decisions in the future.
First, Quinn is important in its recognition of certain inherent pro-
tections within the "uprising" component of the incidence test that
ensure that the international terrorist is not wrongfully harbored.
Offenses can be viewed as political only when they occur within the
borders of the territory whose government the dissidents oppose and
desire to change.1 20 Offenses that occur outside those borders are
deemed to be too remote from the conflict and thus lack any political
meaning. This second territory, therefore, clearly has an interest in
punishing these acts which amount to little more than common crim-
inal activity.
Quinn further recognizes that the political offense exception pro-
tects only those individuals that share a common nationality to the
area in which change is desired.12' The exception is intended "to pro-
tect those seeking to change their own government or to oust an oc-
117. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
118. The courts have received little or no help from either the legislative or execu-
tive branches in developing a political offense test. None of the statutes presently in force
in the United States relating to extradition mention the political offense exception, and
none of the bilateral extraditon treaties that include the exception attempt to define what
is a "political offense" for purposes of the exception.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 52-81.
120. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 807.
121. Id. at 807-08.
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cupying power that is asserting sovereignty over them. ' 122 The ex-
ception is not designed to protect mere "mercenaries or volunteers in
a foreign conflict."' 123 A nonnational must show a "substantial con-
nection" with the territory in which the uprising is occurring to
claim the protection of the exception.124 Combined with other re-
quirements under the uprising component of the incidence test, these
two conditions successfully eliminate many modern terrorist acts
from the political offense exception.
Second, guidelines developed under the "incident to" component
place even greater scrutiny on the offenses of the individual which
are the subject of the extradition request. Quinn takes the idea of
neutrality to its extreme. The Quinn court simply required that the
offense be contemporaneous with the uprising. 2 5 Nonetheless, it was
recognized by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the Supreme
Court's only discussion of the political offense exception, Ornelas v.
Ruiz,126 that more than a mere "liberal nexus" is required between
the offense and the political uprising for the incidence test to be sat-
isfied. The Quinn court thus utilized the same faulty interpretation
of the "incident to" requirement that the courts had blindly applied
in extradition cases previous to McMullen. Such an interpretation
would most certainly allow many true terrorists to avoid extradition
under the political offense exception.
Holmes certainly did not intend that such a simplistic test be ap-
plied to the "incident to" component. As mentioned earlier, Holmes
believed that "the character of the foray, the mode of attack, the
persons killed or captured, and the kind of property taken or de-
stroyed"' 27 also are factors to be considered when making a determi-
nation on the political offense exception. These factors are not so
unlike the ones that were considered in the decisions Quinn
criticizes.
A correct application of the political offense exception must in-
clude considerations beyond the timing of the offense to ensure that
acts driven by mere personal motivation are not protected under the
political offense exception. In Congress' latest attempt to reform ex-
tradition law, the House Subcommittee on Crime recognized such a
122. Id. at 807.
123. Id. at 820 (Fletcher, J., concurring and dissenting).
124. Id. at 820-22.
125. Id. at 809.
126. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
127. Id. at 511. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
need. The proposed Extradition Act of 1984128 attempted to codify
the current case law on the political offense exception. Although the
Act ultimately failed, the proposed legislation did help to clarify the
guidelines Congress felt important in making the political offense de-
termination. These factors are: 1) whether there was an uprising in
the requesting country at the time of the offense; 2) the status of any
victims of the offense; 3) the connection of the person requested with
a particular political organization within the country; 4) the person's
motive in committing the offense; and 5) the connection between the
offender's conduct and the goals of the political organization.120 It
thus seems that many members of Congress agree with the guide-
lines established by the courts concerning the political offense
exception.
Certain categories of acts exist that should never be protected by
the political offense exception. Acts "violative of international law,
and inconsistent with international standards of civilized conduct" 130
are never deserving of political offense protection. The Doherty court
cites Nazi death camps and various war crimes as examples of acts
that are not included in a political offense consideration.1 31
Limitations on the political offense exception based on interna-
tional standards are arguably difficult to ascertain, given the wide
range of world opinion on what may constitute a "war crime" or a
"crime against humanity." There exist, however, widely accepted
treaties that go far to delineate these concepts. 132 Furthermore, the
United States has entered into various other multilateral treaties
which require that certain offenses always be subject to extradition
or punishment by the country in which the fugitive is found.1 33
128. H.R. REP. No. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
129. Id. § 3194(e)(3).
130. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 274.
131. Id.
132. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
133. The United States is party to four multilateral treaties that make airplane
hijacking (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 192, 860 U.N.T.S. 0.), endangerment of civilian
aircraft (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civilian
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 0.), attacks
on internationally protected persons (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec.
14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167), and the taking of
hostages (International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 17, 1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979)), offenses upon which extradition
is to be granted to the requesting country or tried and punished in the state in which the
fugitive is found. These specific treaties are included in article I of the Supplementary
Treaty as offenses no longer to be considered political in extradition requests between the
United States and United Kingdom. See supra note 89.
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It has been almost 100 years since Congress enacted legislation in
the area of extradition.13  Given the recent increase in extradition
requests, a need exists to more clearly outline the extradition pro-
cess, especially the political offense exception. The courts have done
a respectable job in drawing the terrorist-political dissident distinc-
tion in very difficult cases; some structure is needed, however, for
making that distinction in future cases.
The courts have gone to great lengths to distinguish domestic rev-
olutionary conduct to be included under the political offense excep-
tion from terrorism. Drawing from these cases, Congress should out-
line a political offense test requiring that:
1) There must be an uprising or civil disturbance occurring in the country
aimed at altering or abolishing the government in control:
a) the acts charged must occur within the borders of the place whose
government the uprising desires to change;
b) the person sought must be a national of the area desired to be
changed, or have substantial connections with that territory.
2) The offense committed must be in furtherance of the uprising, consider-
ing such factors as:
a) the status of any victims of the offense;
b) the connection of the person requested with a particular dissident
organization within the country;
c) the person's motive in committing the offense;
d) the connection between the offender's conduct and the goals of
the offense;
e) the seriousness of the offense; and
3) The offense must not violate international law.
There still appears to be a widely held belief that the initial extra-
dition decision, along with the political offense determination, is best
left in judicial hands.'35 This belief reflects a continuing view that
concerns for protecting the fundamental liberties of the individual
outweigh any presently expedient foreign policy determination. Con-
gress can best serve this ideal by enacting legislation codifying the
various points the courts have emphasized in making the political
offense determination.
In light of the history and purpose of the extradition process and
the political offense exception in the United States, Congress should
include provisions providing for the initial judicial determination of
all extradition requests, including the applicability of the political
134. With only minor changes, the Extradition Act of 1848 continues to govern
United States extradition procedure.
135. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982) (The Senate For-
eign Relations Committee rejected a proposal in the Extradition Act of 1981 to give the
executive branch power of political offense determination in favor of continuing the
court's role in this area).
offense exception. Through such provisions, Congress can maintain
judicial authority over future extradition proceedings.138
CONCLUSION
The recently ratified Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the
United Kingdom is an unwise attempt to deal with the present prob-
lem of terrorism. The Treaty represents little more than a foreign
policy decision to help the British government more effectively sup-
press the conflict in Northern Ireland, while avoiding the urgent
need to bring about a peaceful solution to the problem.
The judiciary has exercised the unenviable task of applying the
political offense exception for over 100 years with virtually no defini-
tive statement or guidance as to the meaning of the term "political
offense." The judicial branch, especially in recent cases, has at-
tempted to define and apply the exception in light of the ideals that
gave rise to the political offense exception and the practice of extra-
dition. To a significant degree, the courts have succeeded in making
the difficult distinction between offenses to be protected as political,
and "terrorist acts" not to be protected from extradition requests.
Nevertheless, uniformity is lacking - the political offense exception
should be recognized in all extradition requests and a single set of
guidelines should be applied through the courts. Congressional action
would eliminate many of the differences between jurisdictions as to
the application of the exception. Further, such legislation would en-
sure the implementation of a test more attuned to modern realities
while preserving the liberty of all individuals residing in America.
JOHN LAFFERTY
136. There also has been some discussion over whether the courts should continue
to adhere to their traditional rule of noninquiry. See supra text accompanying notes 44-
46. The Supplementary Treaty forces the judiciary to abandon this rule. See supra text
accompanying notes 95-98. Some commentators also have argued that the rule of nonin-
quiry should be discontinued. See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 32, at 201-09. But such a
change in the extradition procedure would be unwise. Having the court consider whether
the individual sought will likely be subject to persecution if returned to the requesting
country forces the courts to cross the line into the area of foreign policy best left to the
executive branch. The political offense determination involves the judiciary into the de-
termination only of past facts. Dismissing the rule of noninquiry forces the courts to try
to guess what future events will take place if the individual is returned to the requesting
country. The executive branch is better suited to make such determinations. (The execu-
tive branch has the ability to make a determination as to the fairness of a requesting
country - 1) when initially entering into a extradition agreement with that country; 2)
when deciding whether to pass on the initial extradition request to the courts for hear-
ings; and 3) when deciding whether to confirm the court's approval of extradition).
